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Executive Summary 
 
 Each of the fifty states oversees at least one public retirement system for employees. This 
study examines which factors affect the funded ratio of these systems. The intent of this paper is 
not to solve the problems facing public retirement systems, but to give decision makers and 
policy leaders a better understanding of what affects the funding levels of these systems. 
Understanding the various factors that affect the funded ratio will help decision makers 
determine which changes should be made to public retirement systems. 
 The funded ratio is one of the main methods used to determine how well funded these 
systems are and indicates an ability to pay accruing liabilities (Boston College Public Plans 
Database). It is defined as actuarial assets divided by actuarial liabilities. Existing literature 
suggests that investment returns and a consistent lack of employer contributions have driven 
down the funded ratio of states' public retirement systems. This paper examines these factors, but 
also looks at the effects of Social Security eligibility, cost of living adjustments, type of 
retirement plan offered, payroll, number of members, and employee contributions.   
 To determine the effect of these variables on the funded ratio, I created a dataset of state-
run public retirement systems from 2001 to 2009. This data was obtained from the Public Plans 
Database, a product of the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College. A model was 
created and a linear regression estimated the effects of the various factors. The linear regression 
model found six significant explanatory variables: plan type, actuarial assets, annual required 
contributions (ARC), payroll, the employee contribution rate, and employer contributions. All of 
the explanatory variables were found to be significant at the 99% confidence interval with the 
exception of employer contributions. Employer contributions were found to be significant at the 
90% confidence interval. 
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 Based on the regression results, I recommend states pay toward the existing ARC. Since 
this impacts the funded ratio, existing statutes prohibiting a certain contribution level or simple 
failure to make payments, will probably increase the amount that states must pay in the future. 
Reducing the ARC will lower the system’s actuarial liabilities relative to assets and potentially 
make future ARC payments lower.  
 Actuarial assets also have a statistically significant impact on the funded ratio in my 
analysis. Though it is outside the scope of this study to make recommendations regarding 
specific retirement systems, my analysis indicates that increasing assets relative to liabilities will 
raise the funded ratio. My results indicate that this could be done through increased employer 
contributions, a reduction in payroll, and lowering the ARC.  
Introduction 
 
 In 2012, the Pew Center on the States estimated that public retirement obligations in the 
United States in 2010 were underfunded by $757 billion, when accounting for current and future 
liabilities (Pew Center on the States 2012). In the fall of 2008, the financial markets experienced 
a near collapse, and public retirement systems suffered from investment losses just like private 
sector companies and individual portfolios. Coupled with changes by state governments in the 
early 2000s that increased payments to retirees, and states’ failure to consistently make the 
annual required contributions to retirement systems, a number of systems faced funding 
challenges (Pew Center on the States 2007). 
 In many instances, states contribute to multiple retirement systems every year. State 
public retirement systems consist not only of the traditional state employees’ retirement systems 
(those people working in the legislative, executive, and judicial branches), but also teachers, fire, 
police, and any other system run by the state. Individual retirement systems exhibit different 
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characteristics across states. For example, the systems vary in the plan type offered to 
employees, the number of members participating, and contributions made - both by the employee 
and the employer. 
 Despite these differences, one of the main criteria used across all systems to judge 
whether or not a retirement system is sufficiently funded, and has the ability to meet current and 
future obligations, is through the calculation of the funded ratio (Munell et. al 2008). The funded 
ratio is defined as actuarial assets divided by actuarial liabilities. Actuarial assets are a system's 
asset value based on the assets' current market value and some unrealized gains and losses from 
previous years. Actuarial liabilities are the present value of future benefits the system must pay 
to retirees (Boston College Public Plans Database).  
 When looking at bordering states or even the same system across years, this ratio 
fluctuates. This inconsistency prompted my research question: which factors affect the funded 
ratio of states’ public retirement systems? I was interested in seeing if the seemingly more 
obvious factors of plan type, investments, and employer contributions were the only factors 
affecting the funded ratio, or if other variables, like the total number of members, cost of living 
adjustments, employee contributions, and Social Security eligibility affected it as well.  
 This paper includes a problem statement, background of applicable information 
pertaining to state-level public retirement systems, a review of a set of academic studies and 
articles, and a research design explaining how the analysis will be conducted. A discussion of my 
regression results, recommendations, limitations, and ideas for future areas of study complete the 
contents of this paper.  
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Problem Statement 
 Given the challenges facing public retirement systems in recent years, it is important to 
examine which factors affect the funded ratio. I believe understanding the factors affecting this 
ratio is helpful to decision makers. Legislators retain the authority to allocate money to these 
systems and make statutory changes to how they operate. If legislators properly understand what 
affects the funded ratio, then it might allow them to make more informed decisions in the future 
regarding possible changes to these systems. This topic is of interest to decision-makers, public-
sector employees, and citizens having to potentially bear the cost if sufficient revenue does not 
exist to pay retirees. Shortfalls in the assets of these systems must be borne through higher taxes 
paid by citizens or through reduced benefits for retirees (Eaton and Nofsinger 2008). In recent 
years, court cases have become an issue for state governments wishing to adjust existing 
retirement benefits. Participants in these systems argue that changing their benefits takes away an 
established right. According to the Center for Retirement Research, in 2009, the most recent year 
in my dataset, public retirement systems had over $3 trillion in liabilities and $2.6 trillion in 
assets (Public Plans Database). 
 As part of this project, I analyze the relationship between the funded ratio and a series of 
explanatory variables selected through a review of existing literature. Based on previous studies 
and my own intuition, I hypothesize actuarial assets, employer and employee contributions, the 
employee contribution rate, total number of members, payroll, Social Security eligibility, and the 
percent of the annual required contribution paid by the employer will positively affect the funded 
ratio. I hypothesize that the type of retirement system, actuarial liabilities, cost of living 
adjustments tied to the Consumer Price Index, and annual required contributions will negatively 
affect the funded ratio. 
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Background and Relevant Facts 
 
Types of Retirement Plans 
 
 Employees in the United States, both in the public and private sectors, generally 
participate in one of two types of retirement plans: defined benefit and defined contribution. A 
defined benefit plan guarantees participants a specified monthly payment during their retirement 
years. This monthly payment amount is usually based on a number of factors, such as the 
participant's years of service with the organization, salary during working years, and age. Often 
the payment is calculated using a formula consisting of these factors (IRS). Because a specified 
payment amount is guaranteed based on a set of pre-determined calculations, the employer bears 
the investment risk in this plan. If investment returns are lower than expected, the employer must 
make up the additional funds to pay retirees. 
 A defined contribution plan consists of contributions made by both the employee and the 
employer to an employee's individual account. At the time of distribution, the amount of funds in 
the account is subject to taxation. The value of the account will fluctuate over time due to market 
performance and contributions. Unlike in a defined benefit plan, an employee participating in a 
defined contribution plan does not receive a guaranteed amount of money during retirement – 
placing the investment risk on the employee. A standard 401(k) plan is an example of this type of 
plan (IRS).   
 No two state public pension systems exhibit the same characteristics in terms of the type 
of plan they offer. The majority of state retirement systems still participate in the traditional 
defined benefit plan, but some systems have adopted either defined contribution or hybrid plans 
over the years. Hybrid plans incorporate elements of both defined benefit and defined 
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contribution plans. Several state governments, including Alaska, now offer this type of plan to 
public employees. 
Investment of Pension Funds 
 
 Once contributions are made to a public retirement system, those contributions are 
invested in various securities to generate income. In calculating the total value of retirement 
benefits for members of a particular system, actuaries make assumptions about investment 
performance. In data obtained from Boston College's Public Plans Database, for 104 state-level 
public retirement systems, the range of projections on investment returns is between four and a 
half to nine percent. On average, an eight percent returned is projected over the long term, a 
higher expected rate than in the private sector (Coggburn and Kearny 2010). Except for the 
Kentucky Employees Retirement System in 2008 and the Kentucky Teachers Retirement System 
in 2007, which projected returns of four and a half percent, all other systems in all other years 
projected at least a seven percent return. It is important to note that actuaries' investment 
assumptions are discounted back to the present over the long term. Despite the annual fluctuation 
in investment returns, which can include multiple years of negative returns, over the long-term 
actuaries expect a positive investment performance. 
 While outside the scope of this project, a system's assets are invested in a variety of 
securities, including stocks, bonds, international securities, real estate, and short-term 
investments. Despite the positive long-term return projections, many systems recorded negative 
investment returns over the years examined in this study (Boston College Public Plans 
Database). 
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Literature Review 
 
 Over the years, a number of studies have reviewed public retirement systems and the 
issues they face. These studies tend to focus on why public retirement systems are underfunded, 
particularly in regard to the type of plan offered to employees, investment returns, and the 
contributions made by employers. Previous studies differ in regard to whether a defined benefit 
plan is the right option for public employers and how much the type of plan offered impacts the 
funding levels of retirement systems. Some of the literature also touches on the role that Social 
Security eligibility might play in regard to systems' funding and employer contributions. Recent 
articles from the Pew Center on the States, published after the start of the Great Recession, 
discuss state governments' efforts in the wake of the financial crisis to fund ailing retirement 
systems. These efforts include changes to cost of living adjustments (COLA) and modifications 
to plan types; however, in multiple states these changes have been challenged by current and 
former public employees participating in the retirement systems.     
Governments and Defined Benefit Plans 
 
 All else equal, scholars assume that employees would prefer a job offering retirement 
benefits to one that does not. Researchers have found that public employers offering defined 
benefit pension plans retain more workers and experience less employee turnover (Almeida and 
Boivie 2009). It appears that defined benefit plans are desirable to workers and an incentive for 
them to work in public service, as opposed to seeking a perhaps higher paying job in the private 
sector. Despite the most recent recession, opportunities for obtaining a job in the public sector 
remain favorable (Franzel 2009). New, and thus a higher number of, employees means greater 
future liabilities for state retirement systems. 
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Defined Benefit Plans and the Funded Ratio 
 
 Lahey and Anenson (2007) believe the problems facing state public retirement systems 
directly stem from the existence of defined benefit pension plans. They make this argument 
because in a defined benefit plan, the state (employer) bears the cost of market fluctuation. If the 
market performs well, then assets rise and states can contribute less state dollars to retirement 
systems. In this scenario, the investment income helps to pay actuarial liabilities; however, if the 
market performs poorly, as it did in the late 2000s, then the employer must pay a greater amount 
of the accruing liabilities from their own funds. Over time, poor market performance contributes 
to the amount that governments must pay into public retirement systems. Coupled with budget 
shortfalls and other state expenditures, payments to retirement systems have sometimes fallen 
behind.   
Lahey and Anenson mention that the primary way to determine whether or not a 
retirement system is funded is to calculate its funded ratio. Their study mentions how this ratio 
fluctuates due to investment returns, and how this fluctuation impacts states' retirement 
liabilities. According to Lahey and Anenson, drops in the funded ratio prove significant, 
especially for state systems participating in defined benefit pension plans. A drop in this ratio 
means more accrued liabilities relative to assets. 
Public Retirement Systems and Employer Contributions 
 
 The funding efforts of public retirement systems are measured through both the funded 
ratio and the system's consistency in making its annual required contribution (ARC) payments 
(Munnell et. al 2008). According to this study, those systems making the ARC accrue sufficient 
savings to pay unfunded and accruing liabilities. Systems that fail to make payments towards the 
ARC will likely experience an increase in unfunded liabilities as any unpaid liabilities from the 
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current year will roll into unfunded liabilities. When unfunded liabilities increase relative to 
assets, the system’s funded ratio decreases. Like Munnell et. al, Truesdell (2011) also concluded 
that state retirement systems with a lower funded ratio have a higher ARC. 
 While some states fail to make ARC payments for other fiscal reasons, Munnell et. al 
(2008) found some states are constrained by statute in regard to how much they can contribute to 
public retirement systems. For example, the authors found that Kansas's 2006 contribution of 
around 63% of its ARC was slightly smaller than actuaries recommended, due to its statutory 
constriction. For states not legally constrained in their contributions, Munnell et. al found that 
larger systems were more likely to fail to make the recommended ARC payments.   
Public Retirement Systems and Social Security 
   
 The Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that more than twenty-five percent 
of state and local government workers do not pay into the Social Security System and are 
ineligible to receive benefits based on their government earnings (Government Accountability 
Office 2012). Koggburn and Kearny (2009) considered the impact of Social Security eligibility 
on public retirement systems between 2006 and 2007. They hypothesized that states not offering 
Social Security to employees would have more funded retirement systems due to the pressure to 
provide public employees with more generous retirement benefits; however, in their analysis, 
they did not find Social Security ineligibility to be statistically significant in relation to unfunded 
liabilities.  
 A 2012 report by the GAO found that employees and employers in public systems 
ineligible for Socials Security benefits make higher contributions to their states' retirement 
systems (Government Accountability Office 2012). The report by the GAO, though, did not use 
statistical analysis to reach this conclusion.  
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 Changes Before the Great Recession   
 
 In 2012, the Pew Charitable Trust estimated that as of 2010, states had unfunded pension 
liabilities of approximately $757 billion. Changes made to these retirement systems in the early 
2000s and market fluctuation throughout the decade impacted public retirement systems. In 
2000, approximately half of the states considered themselves fully funded, with the ability to pay 
future liabilities (Pew Center on the States 2007). At the start of the decade, the market was 
performing strong and some state legislatures decided to make changes to public retirement 
systems. These changes included reducing the age at which employees could start receiving 
benefits and the multipliers used to calculate employees' monthly benefits in defined benefit 
plans. These changes raised the systems' liabilities by increasing the amount of money 
employees were eligible to receive in retirement. Despite adding to the liabilities of the systems, 
a number of states still failed to contribute adequate funding amounts during this time (Lahey 
and Anenson 2007).  
 While the market exhibited a strong performance between 1999 and 2000, by the time of 
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the market had begun to sour and contribution shortfalls 
in public retirement systems hurt asset growth (Pew Center on the States 2007). A 2007 report by 
the Pew Center on the States suggested that pension levels would begin to rise again in 2008. 
Instead, 2008 rocked the financial markets, the Great Recession began, and contributions to 
retirement systems actually declined by five percent between 2008 and 2009 (Pew Center on the 
States 2011). 
Changes Since the Great Recession 
 
 For many years, public retirees have received increased payments from their former 
employers to cover cost of living adjustments; however, since the most recent recession, several 
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state governments’ attempts to change public retirees' cost of living adjustments (COLA) have 
resulted in multiple court cases. Retirees in Colorado, Minnesota, and other states argue that 
eliminating or reducing COLAs violates their constitutional rights by taking away an existing 
benefit.  
 The courts' interpretations of changes to cost of living adjustments in these states have 
been split. For example, the Colorado District Court ruled that retirees participating in the state's 
Public Employees Retirement System (PERA) did not have a contractual right to the COLA that 
existed when they first reached retirement; however, in October 2012, the Colorado Court of 
Appeals reversed the ruling. The Court of Appeals remanded the case back to the district court 
and instructed the district court to determine "if the impairment of the right" was considerable 
and if the COLA reductions served any public purpose (Justus vs. State 2012, 2). This case 
remains ongoing. 
  In June 2011, Minnesota District Judge Gregg Johnson said cost of living adjustments 
are not part of a contractual obligation guaranteed by the Minnesota or Federal Constitutions. In 
his opinion, Johnson said that the power to make changes to COLA resides with the Minnesota 
State Legislature (Fehr 2011). 
Research Design 
 
 This quantitative study examines which factors affect the funded ratio of states' public 
retirement systems. The funded ratio is the state's actuarial assets divided by its actuarial 
liabilities to current and future retirees. A ratio of one or greater indicates the system's full ability 
to pay its current and future retirement obligations. In my dataset, the reported funded ratios 
range from .191 (West Virginia Teachers’ Retirement System in 2001) to 1.48 (University of 
California Retirement System in 2001).  
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 One hundred four state level public retirement systems serve as the units of analyses in 
this study, with the funded ratio acting as the key dependent variable. A public retirement 
system, in the context of this project, includes any retirement system made up of state-level 
public employees and run by the state. Therefore, the funded ratios of public employees, 
teachers, police, fire, and any other employee-specific system run by a state are included in the 
analysis. The number of systems is not uniform across states; however, each of the fifty states 
oversees at least one public retirement system for employees.  
 This study does not examine the funding ratios of local public pension plans, as they are 
separate from the state systems. Additionally, retirement systems run by the District of Columbia 
do not factor into this analysis, as the District is not by definition a state. 
Data Collection 
 
 I obtained the data for this analysis from the Center for Retirement Research at Boston 
College's Public Plans Database (PPD)
1
. The Center for Retirement Research houses retirement 
data on state and local public retirement systems from all fifty states and the District of Columbia 
between 2001 and 2010; however, as of February 2013 the 2010 data had not yet been reported. 
The PPD breaks down the data by the state, plan name, and fiscal year. Information on systems 
participating in hybrid and defined contribution plans was obtained from the appendix in “A 
Role for Defined Contribution Plans in the Public Sector,” a 2011 publication by the Center for 
Retirement Research. Each state and its pension plan(s) included in this study contain data for 
each year between 2001 and 2009. Table 4 in the results section of this paper, provides 
information about summary statistics and missing observations. 
 
                                                             
1 More information on the Public Plans Database at the Center for Retirement Research can be found here: 
http://pubplans.bc.edu/pls/apex/f?p=1988:3:0.  
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Variables 
 
 Initially, I thought about the funded ratio as a function of contributions, payment 
obligations, and characteristics. Contribution variables can be defined as revenue sources. 
Variables include payments into the system by employers and employees as well as annual 
investment earnings. All else equal, an increase in contributions increases the amount of money 
available to pay current and future obligations. Based on my intuition that more dollars into a 
system increases its funding level, I hypothesize that these variables positively affect the funded 
ratio.  
 Governing bodies of state retirement systems invest in a wide range of securities. For the 
purposes of this project, only the actual income levels from investments factor into the analysis. 
Income from specific securities and the amount of assets allocated to various types of securities 
are not examined. Since existing literature discusses a decrease in investment performance since 
the Great Recession, I believe that investment income will positively impact the funded ratio. 
Based on my own intuition, I think that systems with higher funded ratios will have greater 
investment income. 
Table 1: Contribution Variables 
 
Variable Definition Measurement 
Hypothesized 
Relationship to Ratio 
Employee Contributions 
Total amount all 
employees pay  
Millions of 
dollars Positive 
Employee Contribution 
Rate 
Percentage of wages each 
employee contributes 0-1 Positive 
Employer (State) 
Contributions 
Total amount employer 
annually pays  
Millions of 
dollars Positive 
Investment Income 
Amount of income from 
investments 
Millions of 
dollars Positive 
Actuarial Assets 
Actuarial determined 
amount of assets 
Millions of 
dollars Positive 
Source: Author's compilation and the Public Plans Database 
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 Payment obligation variables influence a system's funding levels and size. Granting cost 
of living increases or failing to meet the recommended ARC, all else equal, appear to raise a 
system's liabilities. The ARC is included in this category, because it is the amount actuaries 
suggest the employer pay into the system to cover current liabilities and existing unfunded 
liabilities; however, this suggested amount is not always paid, and previous research suggests 
this affects the funded ratio. Given Truesdell's (2011) finding that states not meeting the 
suggested ARC payments have lower funded ratios then states paying the suggested amounts, I 
hypothesize that not making the suggested ARC payments increases the funded ratio. Since 
previous research concluded that this is a known factor affecting the funded ratio, it would be 
improper to not include ARC in my model. 
 COLA also falls into in this category of variables because as states grant cost of living 
increases to retirees, the pension systems incur greater liabilities. Some retirement systems grant 
a COLA based on the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and others have different means of deciding 
these changes. For example, the Tennessee State and Teachers Retirement System allocates an 
automatic, annual COLA of up to three percent based on the CPI; however, other systems, such 
the Texas Municipal Retirement System, offer retirees a certain percentage of the change to the 
CPI, as approved by the state legislature. Still other systems, like the California Teachers 
Retirement System, have a flat rate (in this case two percent) previously established. I believe a 
COLA tied to the CPI will have a negative relationship to the funded ratio, since states appear to 
have less flexibility in setting the actual cost of living increase granted to retirees. For example, 
if the CPI consistently increases each year, then these systems would be obligated to grant a cost 
of living increase to retirees to reflect this change.  
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Table 2: Payout Variables 
 
Variable Definition Measurement 
Hypothesized 
Relationship to 
Funded Ratio 
Cost of Living Increase 
(COLA)* 
Annual cost of living 
increase to retirees 
0= COLA not tied to 
CPI 
1= COLA tied to CPI Negative 
Actuarial Liabilities 
Actuarial determined 
amount of liabilities Millions of dollars Negative 
Annual Required 
Contribution (ARC) 
What employers must 
pay to cover current and 
unfunded liabilities Millions of dollars Negative 
Percent of ARC 
Percentage of ARC paid 
into by the employer 0-1 Positive 
Source: Author's compilation and the Public Plans Database 
*COLA is a dummy variable 
 
 The third category of explanatory variables is system characteristic variables. System 
characteristics include whether or not employees are eligible for Social Security collection based 
on their government service, actuarial assets, number of members participating in the system, 
and the type of plan offered. 
  I hypothesize that enabling employees to collect Social Security benefits, in addition to 
state pension benefits, will positively impact the funded ratio. Since employees in these plans can 
supplement their state pension income with Social Security, it would appear that employees in 
systems not participating in the Social Security System would need to receive higher pension 
benefits for consumption smoothing purposes. Using my own intuition, I believe that the number 
of retirees in a system has a negative relationship to the funded ratio. All else equal, the greater 
the total members in a system, the greater the amount of money that needs to be paid out in the 
form of retirement benefits. 
 In regard to the type of retirement plan offered, previous studies indicate that when a 
system experiences financial difficulty, it switches from a defined benefit plan to another type of 
plan. Therefore, I believe that defined benefit systems will have a negative relationship to the 
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funded ratio. In order to determine the type of plan public retirement systems participate in, I 
spoke with a researcher at Boston College. After speaking with him and reviewing the data in the 
PPD, I decided to remove three systems from my analysis. These systems either combined 
multiple plans or had name variations that made it difficult to determine the type of plan the 
system participates under. 
Table 3: Characteristic Variables 
 
Variable Description Measurement 
Hypothesized 
Relationship to 
Funded Ratio 
All Members 
Total number of people 
participating in the system Millions of members Positive 
Payroll 
Amount employer pays to 
current employees Millions of dollars Positive 
Social Security*  
Participation in Federal 
Social Security System 
0= Not eligible for 
benefits 
1= Eligible for benefits Positive 
Plan Type*  
Type of system the state 
operates under  
0= Not Defined Benefit 
1= Defined Benefit Negative 
Source: Author's compilation and the Public Plans Database 
*Social Security and Plan Type are dummy variables 
 
Statistical Models 
 
  After formatting my data, I use Stata statistical software to test my hypotheses. Since I 
was interested in finding out the effect of each of my explanatory variables on the funded ratio, I 
used a linear regression model. This model consisted of the key dependent variable, the funded 
ratio, and a series of explanatory variables.  
 Since the funded ratio is calculated as actuarial assets over actuarial liabilities, it was 
inappropriate to include both variables in my regression model. Each of these explanatory 
variables is a linear function of the other, with a correlation of .98. Therefore, I chose to keep 
only the actuarial assets in my model.  
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The linear regression model I used is as follows: 
Funded Ratio = β0 + β1*(Plan Type) + β2*(Actuarial Assets) + β3*(Payroll) + 
β4*(ARC) + β5*(Percent of ARC) + β6*(Employee Contributions) + β7*(Employer 
Contributions) + β8*(Investment Income) + β9*(Social Security) + β10*(COLA) + 
β11*(All Members) + β12*(Employee Contribution Rate) + ε 
 
Since my dataset spans ten years, I controlled for time effects in my model. In order to do this, I 
created a dummy variable for each year between 2001 and 2009. When I ran the linear 
regression, I included each year's dummy variable except 2001. Since I did not include 2001, it 
serves as my base year. Additionally my linear regression model reports robust standard errors to 
control for heteroscedasticity. 
Analysis and Findings 
 
 This study analyzes the funded ratio of 104 state-level public retirement systems. A linear 
regression model was utilized to determine the effect of a series of explanatory variables on the 
funded ratio. The results of the analysis indicate plan type, actuarial assets, payroll, ARC, the 
employee contribution rate, and employer contributions have a statistically significant effect on 
the funded ratio.  
Summary Statistics 
 
The summary statistics in Table 4 are reported in millions and indicate a variation in the 
make-up of states’ public retirement systems. Some state-run systems are relatively small, with 
fewer members and assets compared to the larger systems. All retirement systems indicate the 
presence of actuarial liabilities, but the exact amount of these liabilities varies across systems. Of 
the retirement systems included in my analysis, 38.7% indicate that cost of living increases are 
tied to the Consumer Price Index, either through automatic adjustments or legislative approval. 
Employees participating in nearly 80% of the analyzed state retirement systems are eligible to 
receive social security benefits in addition to state pension benefits.  
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Table 4: Summary Statistics  
 
Variable 
Observations Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Funded Ratio  917 0.847 0.169 0.191 1.477 
Actuarial Assets  
(millions of dollars) 918 21.135 30.488 0.648 244.964 
Actuarial Liabilities  
(millions of dollars) 918 24.3 33.1 0.492 294 
All Members  
(in millions) 928 0.204 0.245 0.001 1.619 
ARC  
(millions of dollars) 936 0.458 0.697 0 7.242 
COLA*  935 0.387 0.487 0 1 
Employee Contributions  
(millions of dollars) 926 0.264 0.418 -0.000001 3.882 
Employer Contributions  
(millions of dollars) 933 0.427 0.707 -0.08 7.242 
Investment Income 
(millions of dollars) 850 -0.067 5.058 -56.918 35.683 
Payroll (millions of dollars) 917 4.720 6.061 0.033 45.1 
Percent of ARC 935 92.465 34.393 0 485.7 
Plan Type* 936 0.906 0.292 0 1 
Social Security*  936 0.769 0.422 0 1 
Source: Author's compilation using STATA and data from the Public Plans Database 
*COLA, Plan Type, and Social Security are dummy variables in my model 
 
Linear Regression 
 
 As Table 5 indicates below, six of the explanatory variables in my model have a 
statistically significant impact on the funded ratio. Five variables have significance at the .01 
level and one variable has significance at the .1 level. Other explanatory variables that I 
originally thought would prove statistically significant in my analysis did not. Due to the high 
correlation between actuarial assets and actuarial liabilities, only actuarial assets were included 
in my linear regression model. 
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Table 5: Linear Regression Results 
 
Funded Ratio Coefficient Robust Std. Error t-statistic p-value 
Plan Type 0.0809 0.0265 3.05 ***0.002 
Actuarial Assets# 0.0062 0.0008 7.41 ***<0.0001 
Payroll#  -0.0089 0.0033 -2.73 ***0.007 
ARC#  -0.1259 0.0269 -4.68 ***<0.0001 
Percent of ARC 0.0003 0.0002 1.44 0.150 
Employee 
Contribution# -0.0097 0.0291 -0.33 0.739 
Employer 
Contribution# -0.0339 0.0197 -1.72 *0.085 
Investment Income# 0.0016 0.0011 1.44 0.151 
Social Security 0.0232 0.0153 1.52 0.130 
COLA 0.0122 0.0094 1.31 0.192 
All Members# 0.0039 0.0550 0.07 0.943 
Employee 
Contribution Rate -1.0940 0.2335 -4.68 ***<0.0001 
FY 2002 -0.0456 0.0283 -1.63 0.104 
FY 2003 -0.0798 0.0274 -2.91 ***0.004 
FY 2004 -0.0953 0.0260 -3.67 ***<0.0001 
FY 2005 -0.1089 0.0257 -4.23 ***<0.0001 
FY 2006 -0.1119 0.0262 -4.27 ***<0.0001 
FY 2007 -0.0951 0.0264 -3.60 ***<0.0001 
FY 2008 -0.1170 0.0253 -4.62 ***<0.0001 
FY 2009 -0.1499 0.0258 -5.81 ***<0.0001 
Source: Author’s compilation using output from STATA and data from the Public Plans Database 
Significance: ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.1; n=744; R-squared=.4222 
# Indicates that the coefficient is reported in millions 
  
Since I accounted for time effects in my model, the substantive magnitude of the 
significant variables is an illustration of what the impact would have looked like in my base year 
of 2001. In my model, the time effects are statistically significant (p<.01) and have a negative 
relationship to the funded ratio. The funded ratio experienced a downward trend between 2002 
and 2009. Though still negative, the ratio went up slightly in 2007. Of particular interest is 2009, 
when the funded ratio decreased nearly fifteen percent relative to the base year of 2001. 
Plan type has a positive and statistically significant relationship to the funded ratio. All 
else equal, participation in a defined benefit retirement plan increases the funded ratio of 
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retirement systems .08. This runs counter-intuitive to my initial hypothesis that offering a 
defined benefit plan would negatively impact the funded ratio.  
A positive and statistically significant relationship exists between the funded ratio and a 
system’s actuarial assets. This relationship exists at the .01 level. For example, a $1 million 
increase in actuarial assets would increase the funded ratio by .006. This result is not surprising 
given that the funded ratio is actuarial assets divided by actuarial liabilities. States with higher 
assets relative to liabilities would appear to be more able to pay accruing liabilities.   
The annual required contributions (ARC) has a negative and statistically significant 
relationship with the funded ratio (p<.01). Systems with a larger ARC have lower funded ratios. 
As an illustration, a $1 million increase in ARC would decrease the funded ratio by .126. This 
result supports my original hypothesis and existing literature. Given that ARC includes both 
employer contributions necessary for a current fiscal year, as well as existing unfunded 
liabilities, it makes sense that having a larger ARC would negatively impact funding levels.  
Employer contributions have a negative and statistically significant relationship to the 
funded ratio (p<.1). For every $1 million increase in employer contributions, the funded ratio 
decreases by .0339. This finding goes against my initial hypothesis which was that increased 
contributions would increase the funded ratio. Although my regression model does not tell me 
why this relationship exists, one possible explanation is that systems increase their contributions 
as new employees join the system. Bringing more people into the system affects the amount of 
benefits that need to be paid out in the future, all else equal. This relationship could also exist 
because if an employer is required to contribute more money per current employee, the employer 
might be less able to pay down the ARC. If the system cannot reduce ARC, liabilities will 
continue to exist. 
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The employee contribution rate has a negative and statistically significant relationship to 
the funded ratio (p<.01). In my base year of 2001, a one percent increase in the rate of wages that 
employees contribute to public retirement systems decreases the funded ratio by .01. This impact 
could result from having more employee contributions paid into the system that will eventually 
need be paid out in the form of benefits.  
Last, a system’s payroll and the funded ratio have a negative and statistically significant 
relationship (p<.01). As systems’ payrolls increase, the funded ratio decreases. For example, a $1 
million increase in payroll decreases the funded ratio by .008; however, a $10 million increase in 
payroll would decrease the funded ratio by .08. This result was the opposite of my hypothesis. 
Based on my own intuition, I reasoned that if payroll was higher, it would indicate the retirement 
system has a larger contribution base. After reviewing my results, though, it seems that this 
relationship could exist because more employees on the payroll means more people eventually 
collecting benefits from the retirement system. 
Some of the variables that I expected to be statistically significant, and was personally 
most interested in, did not affect the funded ratio in the way I thought they would.  In the wake 
of the Great Recession, states began making changes to cost of living adjustments for 
participants in their retirement systems. Given that nearly forty percent of my data tie these 
increases to changes in the CPI, I thought this variable would have a significant relationship to 
the funded ratio. Also, investment income was insignificant, going against my initial hypothesis. 
Existing literature from the Pew Center on the States and other scholarly articles discuss the 
downturn in the stock market following the financial crisis. The literature mentions that this 
income reduction spurred decision-makers to make tweaks to retirement systems to increase 
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funding. Therefore, it was surprising to me to find its lack of any statistical significance in my 
model. 
Additionally, I originally hypothesized that Social Security eligibility would have an 
impact on the funded ratio. Existing literature suggests that employees in public retirement 
systems not participating in the Social Security System receive higher benefits from these 
systems during retirement. Therefore, I hypothesized that systems that participate in Social 
Security would have a higher funded ratio. My analysis, though, did not show this relationship to 
be significant.  
Limitations 
 
 As previously discussed, public retirement systems differ in their individual 
characteristics. A limitation of the PPD is that it does not contain all unobserved factors or all of 
the underlying assumptions used in each system’s calculations. Since actuarial assets and 
liabilities include assumptions about current and future obligations, having the calculations used 
by each system’s actuaries would be helpful in creating an equalizing comparison of these 
variables across systems.  
Additionally, the Public Plans Database reports data from 2001 until 2010, though as of 
February 2013, the 2010 data had yet to be included in the database. Ten years of analyzed data 
from 104 public retirement systems increased the internal validity of this study and my results 
are consistent; however, it is important to mention that the years analyzed in this study contain 
data from the 2008 financial crisis. During this time, the markets dramatically fluctuated and 
investment income plummeted. For example, relative to my base year of 2001, the funded ratio 
in my linear regression model decreased by roughly fifteen percent in 2009. A recession like the 
one that began in the fall of 2008 does not occur on a regular basis. Due to this occurrence, the 
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results obtained from this analysis could differ for another time period. Since the financial crisis 
had such a large impact on the US economy, I suspect this could be the case.  
As previously mentioned, this study only focused on state level public retirement 
systems. Given this fact, it would be inappropriate to generalize the results of this study to local 
governments’ retirement systems, as these systems exhibit different characteristics from the 
larger state systems.  
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
 According to existing literature, the funded ratio is one of the primary determinants of 
whether or not a public retirement system has sufficient funding levels to pay current and future 
liabilities (Munnell et. al 2008). Although a number of the variables I thought would hold 
statistical significance in my model did not, I am still able to offer recommendations based on 
my results.   
 First, I recommend decision-makers pay attention to the annual required contributions, 
since in my analysis ARC had a negative and statistically significant impact on the funded ratio. 
In other words, states with higher funded ratios have a lower ARC. Some public retirement 
systems in my dataset have billions of dollars in existing ARC. I understand that states often 
cannot afford to pay all of their underfunded liabilities in one fiscal year; however, the more a 
state pays towards the ARC, the more funded their retirement systems will be. If a state has a 
statutory limit on how much funding can be contributed to the state’s retirement systems each 
year, I recommend that legislators and legislative staff review these laws. Even if a state is 
adequately funded now, failing to make future payments towards ARC will raise the amount 
required to cover liabilities and decrease actuarial assets. Laws preventing the suggested 
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contributions from being made, even if the funds are available, might prove disastrous for a 
system. 
 Second, raising a system’s assets relative to liabilities is important, as my results show 
that actuarial assets have a positive effect on the funded ratio. Based on my results, methods such 
as decreasing payroll or reducing ARC would raise assets relative to liabilities. I recommend 
decision-makers study what specific changes need to be made to their state's retirement systems 
to make this happen. 
 Research has shown that the opportunity for employment in the public sector remains 
promising and that employees prefer jobs with benefits to those without them. In order to ensure 
that public retirement systems continue to function as they should in the future, decision-makers 
should examine the factors that affect the funded ratio of all of the state retirement systems in 
their states. Using that knowledge, they will have a better understanding about which changes 
need to be made to the systems and any laws that place constraints on the system.  
Areas for Future Study 
 
 The analysis of the funded ratio of states’ public retirement systems provides a number of 
opportunities for future research. As previously mentioned two limitations of this study were the 
absences of unobserved factors and missing underlying assumptions. Using a method that could 
take all of the different actuarial calculations and standardize them across systems would be very 
useful to decision makers in the public sector.  
 Additionally, this study does not examine how the age at retirement or the duration over 
which retirement benefits received affects a system’s funding. This data was not available on the 
Public Plans Database, but researching this topic could prove useful when considering changes to 
public retirement systems, their funding levels, and the benefits paid out. 
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 While public retirement systems certainly face many challenges, no existing literature 
suggests that these systems will be disappearing in the near future. Continuing to conduct 
research, not only on the funded ratio and factors affecting it, but also retirement systems 
generally, will give decision makers and those in relevant leadership positions, further 
recommendations on which to base their decisions. For any possible changes to public 
employees’ retirement, decision makers should have as much data on the subject as they can and 
a firm understanding of factors affecting the system. 
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